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Social groups with widely different music tastes, political convictions, and religious beliefs emerge and
disappear on scales from extreme subcultures to mainstream mass-cultures. Both the underlying social
structure and the formation of opinions are dynamic and changes in one affect the other. Several positive
feedback mechanisms have been proposed to drive the diversity in social and economic systems (1, 2), but
little effort has been devoted to pinpoint the interplay between a dynamically changing social network and
the spread and gathering of information on the network. Here we analyze this phenomenon in terms of a
social network-model that explicitly simulates the feedback between information assembly and emergence
of social structures: changing beliefs are coupled to changing relationships because agents self-organize a
dynamic network to facilitate their hunter-gatherer behavior in information space. Our analysis demon-
strates that tribal organizations and modular social networks can emerge as a result of contact-seeking
agents that reinforce their beliefs among like-minded. We also find that prestigious persons can streamline
the social network into hierarchical structures around themselves.
The competition between segregation and coherence in so-
cial systems has long been a subject of both practical and theo-
retical interest. T. Schelling proposed simple models to under-
stand how segregation emerge in urban areas (3) and B. Arthur
suggested that the emergence of industrial centers is a result
of positive feedback between agencies that prefer to be close
to similar agencies (1). In general, the goal of individuals to
understand and agree with their closest associates (4, 5, 6)
can be obtained by either merging opinions with friends or
by creating new contacts. In this spirit, we will discuss a so-
cial network model where individuals can use their connec-
tions to communicate and update their views with friends or
establish new contacts via friends to shortcut communication
pathways. By modeling communication on the network and
adaptive rewiring of the network together, we reveal strong
reinforcement of opinions in emerging group structures.
To comprehend the dynamics of opinions in a social sys-
tem, it is important to understand the coupling to the social
structure the dynamics is embedded in (6, 7, 8, 9). For exam-
ple, if anyone shares information with anyone else without any
preference, the society can be described by a simple mean-
field model where everyone has access to all information. On
the other hand, if people only interact with a small number of
friends, the description of the system must reflect this com-
munication constraint. A network representation of the inter-
actions in the system is a powerful way to depict the limited
access to information; a static network with exchange of infor-
mation between and about nearest neighbors alone represents
a scenario with the most limited access to global information.
Which world do we live in?
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FIG. 1 Interplay between network structure and the extent η to which
recent gossiping influences the priority in social climbing. Varying η,
the bottom pane illustrates cliquishness (C), diameter (D), and social
horizon (E). Simulations based on C = 10 communication events per
link for each rewiring event in the system with system size fixed to
N = 100 and L = 150 links. The results are robust to a hundred-
fold drop in the communication to rewiring ratio, but break down at
an even lower communication rate when only small groups can be
maintained by the communication. Panels C-E also illustrate the de-
pendence of the rate of opinion adaptation, flexibility, with stubborn
adaptation referring to a µ = 0.01% change of the interest elements
per communication event, and flexible referring to µ = 1% change.
We define the flexibility as µCL. Stubborn adaptation corresponds to
a flexibility of 15% changes in all interest memory when all links are
changed once whereas flexible adaptation corresponds to complete
reallocation.
2Taking the latter perspective, an immense literature on
opinion formation on static networks, most straightforward
formulated in the voter model (10, 11), has helped us under-
stand how the structural constraints affect the dynamics. In
this letter, we take a different approach and instead ask where
the preference for specific information comes from and how
the network constraints can be overcome to make this infor-
mation accessible.
To open up the world beyond nearest neighbors, we present
a game in which we let agents improve their positions in a
dynamic network based on their limited local perception of
the system. To maintain this perception, they continuously
communicate to obtain (1) a picture of where other agents
are in the network and (2) an opinion about the importance
of other agents. We incorporate information flows from dis-
tant parts of the social network into the model by letting two
connected agents communicate and share information about
any third agent in the network. This indirect information-
gathering resembles the frequent gossiping in daily life and
its consequences for non-local information assembly has been
investigated in static social networks (12).
To incorporate the above elements in a simple model, we
give each agent an individual memory. The memory includes
three vectors with (1a) N pointers associated to the N agents in
the system that show which friend provided information about
the agent, (1b) the age of each of the N pieces of information
to compare the quality of the information with friends, and (2)
the names of other agents filling the memory to an extent that
reflects the interest in these agents. The memory in (1a) and
(1b) is a map and (2) is the priority.
We emphasize that all agents have a pointer, an age of this
pointer and a priority for each other agent in the system. The
pointer and its age in itself is enough to allow communicating
agents to build an operative map (13) of their own position in
the network as described below. With the priority memory,
we can incorporate simplified human behavior by introducing
rules that mimic individuals’ choices when selecting who they
want to connect to or talk about. This makes it possible to ex-
plore the mechanisms behind the emergence opinions among
individuals.
The memory is updated through communication over links
in the network, which in turn are rewired based on the lo-
cally obtained knowledge. Because of the ongoing changes
in the social network, the obtained knowledge becomes out-
dated with time. Accordingly, when two agents communicate
about a third agent, they first decide which of them that has
the newest information (13). This information is considered
the most reliable, and the agent with the older information up-
dates its information using the agent with the newer informa-
tion as a reliable source of information about the third agent.
We increment the age in (1b) for all agents when every link
has participated in on average one communication event in
the system. Because every agent always has information with
age 0 about itself, the age of the information about an agent
will tend to get older the further away it is from the agent in
the network. The age of the information is therefore a good
proxy for its quality, assuming that agents are not lying.
The basic model, accessible as a Java applet with a detailed
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FIG. 2 Network structures where one agent, the prophet P, has in-
creased prestigious power to capture an unusually large fraction of
the memory of whoever she talks to. The results are based on a
prophet with (A) weak prestige P = 2, and (B) high prestige P = 10.
Note that when sub-networks separate entirely, as in panel A, the
agents still maintain information about who they should contact in
the social climbing step and separated clusters can reconnect. The
WP values correspond to the fraction of global interest devoted to the
prophet. Other parameters as in Fig. 1B.
description (14), is defined in terms of N agents with a fixed
number L of links. The network model is executed in time
steps, each consisting of one of the two events:
• Communication C: Chose a random link and let the two
agents connected by the link communicate about a third
agent selected by one of them. The two agents also
update their information about each other.
• Social climbing R: Let a random agent use the local
information to form a link to a friend’s friend to shorten
its distance to a selected third agent. Subsequently a
random agent loses one of its links.
Communication or gossiping involves evaluation of infor-
mation quality based on its age as described above. The so-
cial climbing, which corresponds to rewiring of the network,
is a slow process compared to gossiping. If this was not the
case, random people would share reliable information with
anybody and the interactions could be simpler described by a
mean-field model. We therefore simulated the model with 10
communications per link for each rewiring event in the sys-
tem. Links are formed to friends of friends similar to triadic
closure (15), reflecting a gradual social climbing. Here friends
refer to the particular agents that have provided the most re-
cent information about the selected agent. The new links are
therefore formed on basis of the memory rather than on basis
of the present network (16).
To be able to investigate the reinforcement of opinions, we
vary the way we specify the selection criterion for the third
person, the agent of interest, in the communication and the
social climbing events. Figure 1A and B illustrate that two
different selection mechanisms can give rise to widely differ-
ent social networks. To generate the network in Fig. 1A, we
let the agents select the agent of interest randomly with equal
3chance for any agent. In contrast, to generate the modular
network in Fig. 1B, we let one of the communicating agents
use her prioritized memory to select the agent of interest (in a
communication event we always let the other agent passively
accepts the choice). Following Spencer’s (17) observation of
proportionality between interest and previous experience, an
agent’s priority memory is filled with other agents’ names pro-
portional to their occurrence in the agent’s resent gossiping.
Related to this use of proportionate selection is the work by
H. Simon (18) to explain Zipf’s law and the work presented in
refs. (19, 20) to model emergence of fashions.
The priority memory is essential for modular structures to
emerge. Let us therefore describe in more detail how we im-
plement the proportionate selection when building the prior-
ity memory for each agent. We regulate the extent to which
agents select the topic of conversation according to recent gos-
siping by the external parameter η, which may also be under-
stood as the ratio of local to global interest. For each agent
j, we model the priority memory in (2) above by Nη ele-
ments. The first N elements are static and fixed to each of
the N agents’ names corresponding to the global interest. The
remaining memory can be changed by communication. When
agent j talks to, or hears about, another agent i, the name of
i will randomly replace a fraction µ of this memory. Old pri-
orities will thereby slowly fade as they are replaced by new
topics of interest.
In selecting communication topic or aim of social climbing,
agent i is chosen with probability w j(i ) = n j(i )/(Nη) propor-
tional to how many times the name of i occurs in agent j’s
priority memory, n j(i ). The size of η determines the degree
of preferential allocation of memory. For η = 1 any topic
is selected with equal chance (global interest, see Fig. 1A),
whereas larger η increases the chance that the agents choose a
topic proportionate to personal experience (17) (local interest,
see Fig. 1B).
A dominant local interest with large η predicts an evolv-
ing network with pronounced modular structure as in Fig. 1B.
The emerging modular network does no longer develop large
hubs, but instead shows large cliquishness quantified by the
number of triangle motifs in units of the random expectation
(21), △/△r (see Fig. 1C). Figure 1D shows that the diameter
dmax of the network easily doubles as η increases, weakening
the small-world effect (22) and the global navigability of the
network (23) (to illustrate the robustness of the model, we in
Fig. 1C-E show the results for two different opinion adapta-
tion rates µ).
To quantify the locally acquired interest we counted the ef-
fective number of persons, nlocal, a typical agent has in the
interest memory
nlocal = 〈
1
N〈w2j (i )〉 i
〉 j. (1)
Here 〈w2j (i )〉i averages over the weights allocated to different
interests i of agent j. Figure 1E shows this social horizon
of the individual agent, nlocal, as well as the global horizon
where all memories are pooled together in nglobal (24). As η in-
creases, nlocal collapses while nglobal remains on the scale of N
— the development toward social cliques is democratic, with
anyone getting a fair share of attention while still allowing
people to focus locally on members of their particular “club”.
The extent to which this club is maintained and closed for mi-
gration is controlled by the flexibility defined in the caption of
Fig. 1; the modular structure breaks down when one changes
opinion faster than one changes friends.
We would like to emphasize that our model presents a
spherical cow of human memory and response quantified
through 3 parameters: the communication level C, the local
to global interest η, and the flexibility µ. For C sufficiently
high, our results are independent of further increase in com-
munication. At any reasonably low level of flexibility µ, the
evolving system develops a modular structure and a dimin-
ished information horizon with increased η. Thus the model
emphasizes the proportionate interest allocation (17, 18) as
the key parameter for development of segregation.
Our idealized model-world consists of agents with equal
properties. In spite of this equality, the model predicts segre-
gation in the form of a social network with modular structure
with widely different priorities and opinions. The local agree-
ment and global divergence self-organize as a consequence
of repeated recent communication and reinforced contacts to
people one gossips about.
Central to the model is to build and use the priority memory.
Here we have explored a particularly simple linear model for
both the construction and the use of priorities. But we stress
that the model framework can be extended to more detailed
networking games, including for example trust (25), cheating
agents (26), or update of priorities based on experiences of the
reliability of the obtained information. Undoubtedly, real hu-
mans will have different intrinsic properties. As the simplest
example of how heterogeneous agents may influence the sys-
tem, we will study the case where one agent has one special
property.
We consider a simple directed strategy to influence public
opinion aimed to increase the status of a particular agent.
• Prophet P: each time agent P communicates, she im-
poses her personality on the agent j she talks to by con-
verting a fraction Pµ of this agent’s interest memory to
P.
The “prophet” uses the local network structure in analogy to
the way the so called “heroes” or social leaders have influ-
enced the society with their acquired prestige (27, 28, 29).
The spreading of information across the system is anal-
ogous to viral marketing (30), which makes it possible for
the prophet to reinforce her position by gaining visibility and
subsequently links from larger parts of the system. Moreover,
higher connectivity makes the prophet preferentially more
accessible to people and the prestige-biased transmission
of ideas (29) modeled by the priority memory connects the
positive feedback. When P = 1 the prophet P becomes a
normal agent, and the overall network develops to resemble
the one in Fig. 1B. Figure 2 shows that an agent’s increased
ability to positively bias other persons’ interest memories
drives the network topology toward a centralized structure.
For example, a single prophet with strength P = 2 can
4generate a substantial group of followers (Fig. 2A). The
figure also illustrates that separated social groups can emerge
and collapse by temporarily weaker interest in other agents.
Figure 2B shows that a strong prophet drives the full system
to a single hierarchical structure. In fact, by measuring the
social horizons we find that a single P with strength P = 10
drives both nlocal and nglobal to about 2 — a dominating
prophet can efficiently initiate a totalitarian system to an
extent that people barely think about anybody except the
social leader. This facilitates social coherence and order, but
obviously not the formation of diverse cultures or coexistence
of small communities.
In general, the emerging structures are robust consequences
of an interplay between the following positive feedback mech-
anisms:
new information.
3) Segregation: move toward opinion localization of opinion.
1) Network centrality: being central
2) Positive assortment: agent’s opinion neighbor’s opinion.
Without individuals with personal interests only the first feed-
back is active, but is in itself enough to give the network a
broad degree-distribution (26). The two subsequent reinforce-
ments generate interest groups and segregation manifested in
a modular network. Together these feedbacks make it very
favorable to manipulate opinion spreading. Here we have pre-
sented a framework which can give insight into the mech-
anisms of communication strategies in historical as well as
modern propaganda.
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